Archive for May, 2010

Jang Article on Masood Sharif Khan Khattak

May 22nd, 2010

First name, last name) edition volume city of publication (first one listed) publisher copyright date page(s) 5 b

Changing Face of Militancy in Karachi – The Express Tribune

May 8th, 2010

Karachi Map

Some reports are more significant for what they don’t say than what they do.

The recent report regarding terrorism in Sindh compiled by the Crime Investigation Department (CID) of the province is one such report. A curious blend of historical facts with contemporary phenomena, the report ends up positing some self-evident ‘truths’ and concludes with some far-fetched theories on what has happened.

The truly worrying bit, caution security analysts is that if the CID which is supposed to be the intelligence arm of the police and liaises with the intelligence apparatus doesn’t know, who does? The report begins with the premise that al Qaeda and the Taliban have created a nexus with sectarian outfits based in the city. To support this, a list of the links of terrorists arrested by the CID is furnished.

Of the 246 terrorists apprehended between August 2001 and now, a staggering 94 belong to the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, 12 to the Sipah-e-Sahaba, 40 to the Harkatul Mujahideen al Alami, 36 to the “Tehreeke- Taliban Pakistan/al Qaeda” while another eight are “Shia militants”. Others are from the Jundullah, Tehreek-e- Jafria, Sunni Tehreek and Lashkar-e-Islami.

The “Observations” section is perhaps the most interesting bit of the report. Almost all terrorists, it is said, have trained in Afghanistan and on arrival in Karachi, form the “nucleus” of small groups on their return. The emergence of “diehard militants” the report puts down to either incarceration or “harrowing experiences at the hands of Western powers.” Significantly, the report says that all the groups provide logistical support and manpower to each other and to al Qaeda and the TTP.

Security analysts wellversed with the demographics of the city, however, aren’t willing to buy these claims. “9/11 changed a lot of realities here,” argues ex-Citizens Police Liaison Committee chief Jameel Yusuf. “Before 9/11, there was a clear operational strategy: training was conducted in Afghanistan, after that the militants were fed to Kashmir. They were united by a common purpose that was Kashmir. That ‘central command’ or ‘unifying principle’ collapsed after 9/11.” » More: Changing Face of Militancy in Karachi – The Express Tribune